Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 20 | Issue 4

Article 5

6-1-1945

Recent Decisions
John F. Power
Francis J. Paulson
John D. O'Neill
Arthur M. Diamond

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
John F. Power, Francis J. Paulson, John D. O'Neill & Arthur M. Diamond, Recent Decisions, 20 Notre Dame L. Rev. 445 (1945).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol20/iss4/5

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS
point that the small stockholder deserves protection, and though these
two boards are doing marvelously there is still a need for more improvement on this particular point.
As to the non-applicability of the statute of limitations on actions
that may be brought before these two Commissions, the author places
this feature of the Commissions next in importance to the investigatory
feature peculiar to these two Commissions. After a few choice sentences which set the particular situation out the author goes through
countless cases bearing directly upon this point.
Compensation of counsel is the next of the subdivisions to consider.
The question which is presented and which is the crux of the matter
is who is to pay for the action - the corporation or the complainant
stockholder; and moreover, if the complainant stockholder is successful can the corporation be held for the fee of the complainant stockholder's attorney. The latest case in New York brought the following
comment from the Commission: "Compensation for counsel fees for a
successful action before a Commission may be sought for in an independent action in the state courts."
With a hopeful eye to the future the author concludes that the small
stockholders need not be taken as a pawn for the large combinations,
if only the proper authorities will face the situation and remedy it.
Norbert S. Wleklinski.

RECENT DECISIONS
BINDING EFFECT OF PUBLICATION OF NOTICE TO BONDHOLDERSOFFER AND ACCEPTANCE.-R. E. Crummer & Co.

CONTRACTS -

v.

Nuveen, et al. Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, Feb. 8, 1945,
147 Fed. (2d) 3.-This cause of action arises under a contract between
R. E. Crummer & Co., the plaintiff and appellant, and the John Nuveen
Company, defendant and appellee.
The original bill of complaint alleged that on the 25th day of November and the 29th day of November, 1941, the defendants desiring
to buy certain bonds at par, caused publication of a notice in a daily
and weekly paper. At the time of said publication, the plaintiff was the
owner and holder of $458,829.00 of said bonds dated June 1st, 1940
and due June 1st, 1970. The complaint further alleged that defendants
had arranged with the Manufacturers' Bank of New York to deposit
the funds necessary to cover all such bonds presented for payment pursuant to the terms of the notice. The plaintiff in reliance on the notice
delivered its bonds to said bank on the 11th day of December, 1941,
but the bank refused to pay the principal amount as provided by the
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notice, which forced the plaintiff to sell to other parties at a lesser sum,
suffering thereby damage to the extent of $35,000.00.
Defendants moved for and obtained a dismissal in the lower court
on the grounds that the advertisement was merely a solicitation for offers to sell the bonds, and not an offer to purchase them, and that if it
was an offer, it had lapsed according to the reasonable time for acceptance doctrine.
On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals held that while it is true that
an offer lapses by expiration of time when no time is fixed for acceptance, this doctrine does not apply when the parties treat the offer as
continuing in force. "An offer remains in force as long as it is treated by
both parties as being in force, even though what would otherwise be a
reasonable time elapsed."
As for the question whether an advertisement constitutes an offer,
or a solicitation for offers, the court said that it was first necessary to
distinguish a general offer from a general invitation to make an offer,
and upon doing so if the offer made by means of advertisements, circulars and the like shows an intent to assume legal liability thereby,
such offer on acceptance forms a contract. This intention in turn is
drawn from the facts and circumstances of each particular case. It was
decided that the meaning of an offer, if doubtful, to purchase certain
county bonds at par and "interest to December 1st" was not an issue
to be decided as a matter of law on a motion to dismiss a bondholder's
complaint for damages for breach of contract, but rather a question of
fact for the jury. The judgment of the lower court in dismissing the
complaint on motion of the defendants, was then declared erroneous,
and judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
John F. Power.

LIMITATIONS op ACTIONS - ARMY AND NAv.-Blazejowski v. Stadnicki- ...... Mass. ....... 58 N. E. (2d) 164, December 6, 1944.-A recent
case, particularly interesting because of the issues involved, was Blazejowski v. Stadnicki in which the application of a statute of limitations
as applied when the defendant was in military service was questioned.
Defendant, while on active military service, injured the plaintiff by hitting the latter with an automobile. The plaintiff, a civilian, subsequently
brought an action in tort against the defendant. The defendant meantime had procured a discharge from the army and for a defense pleaded
the statute of limitations as the plaintiff had not brought his action
within one year from the time that the cause of action accrued as the
Massachusetts law requires.
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It was the contention of the defendant that since the plaintiff had
not prosecuted his suit within the time allowed by Massachusett's statutes he was barred by the statute of limitations. Or perhaps more simply the question resolved itself into the query whether by reason of the
Soldier's and Sailor's Civil Relief- Act of 1940, amended in 1942, the
period of military service should be included in computing the time for
bringing action under the state statute of limitation.
Section 205 of the Soldier's and Sailor's Civil Relief Act of 1940
reads: "The period of military service shall not be included in computing any period * * * limited by any law * * * for the bringing of any
action or proceeding in any court * * * by or against any person in
military service, or by or against his heirs, executors, administrators, or
assigns, * * *" Since the enactment was one of a remedial nature it is
clear that it should be construed liberally in favor of the rights of the
persons engaged in military service. The defendant's contention, however, went much further and was that only the persons in military
service had the right to invoke the provisions of the statute and toll the
statute of limitations. He argued that a civilian could not use the facts
of a defendant's military service to the prejudice of the defendant. He
contended that only the persons in military service could invoke the
provisions of the act to stop the statute of limitations and relied upon
the avowed purpose of the legislation that the Civil Relief Act should
be construed liberally in favor of those in military service.
The lower court found for the plaintiff and the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts affirmed the lower tribunal's decision and said: "If this
wording, which is clear and unambiguous and not doubtful, is to be
whittled down by judicial interpretation to comprise only those actions
in which a party in military service chooses to rely upon or plead the
fact of such service, we think that such implied exception should be declared by the court finally empowered to pass upon the scope of acts
of Congress."
The Court held that the time of military service of the defendant
should not be included in computing the time for bringing actions under
the state law and held that the provisions of the federal statute were
not inapplicable when the plaintiff in action computes time for bringing
an action against a defendant who has been in military service.
Francis J. Paulson.

TELEPHONES AND TELEGRAPHS LEGALITY OF SPECIAL TOLL
CHARGEs BY HoTELs.-Ambassador Inc. Washington Annapolis Hotel

Company, David A. Baer and Robert Scholz a partnership et al., Appelants v. The United States of America, American Telephone and
Telegraph Company, et al.-Decided May 21st, 1945 [65 S. Ct ...... ].
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-This action was instituted at the request of the FCC in the District
of Columbia Federal Court. The complaint asks and the Court below
has granted an injunction which forbids the appellants to make charges
against their guests in connection with any interstate or foreign message toll service to or from their premises other than the toll charges
of the telephone companies and applicable federal taxes. The prohibition is based on a provision to that effect in the tariff filed by the telephone companies. Evidence being limited by stipulation to one hotel,
the Shoreham, as being typical.
In these hotels as in many others service charges are placed on guest
bills for toll charge calls made through the connection for which the
hotel is responsible. The hotel has a PBX board that has a number of
trunk lines running through it and also connection with all the rooms.
The standard method is followed in charging of these tolls. The hotel
receives the notations and pay the charges. These in turn are placed on
the guest's bill but in addition certain service charges are added in order
that the hotel may recoup cost of extra service as well as cost of the
rental charges on equipment.
Investigation disclosed that these charges in excess of the actual
amount varied but were on the average, 10 cents for calls under a dollar, and a certain percentage after a dollar, with a maximum, generally
of three dollars.
The FCC instituted proceedings in 1942 for a clarification of this
procedure and questioned whether these charges appeared in the tariffs
filed with the Commission. It was determined then that the FCC does
have the right to investigate charges of this kind and since that time
(Dec. 1943) have been working on the case.
As a means of establishing these procedures correctly the Telephone
companies filed a tariff provision with the FCC on the basis that the
Hotels were agents of the A. T. and T. et al., and also averred in the
filing that these extra charges were not to be made on the service of the
telephone companies to the hotels.
The lower court sustained the validity of the tariffs filed by the telephone companies and the Hotels appealed. In part the Supreme Court
by Mr. justice Jackson said: "It is clear that the charges being made
in this case violate the regulation. The charges made are not based on
the service rendered by the hotel but vary in accordance with the toll
charge made by the Telephone companies for communications services.
• . . It is sufficient to say that the relation is one which the statute
contemplates shall be governed by reasonable regulations initiated by
the telephone company but subject to the approval and review of the
FCC:... We hold the injunction was properly issued and the judgment
below is affirmed."
John D. O'Neill.
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WAR-

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS UNDER THE SELECTIVE SERVICE

AcT.-Brooks v. United States, 147 F. (2d) 134 (1945). Dist. Ct.The appellant appeals from a conviction for violation of the Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940. Appellant, a citizen of the United
States, was duly registered and classified 4E, as a conscientious objector,
by his local board. Having passed a physical and mental examination,
he was ordered to report for transportation to Civilian Public Service
Camp No. 111 at Mancos, Colorado. He refused to report and so notified his local board. For this action he was indicted, tried, convicted, and
sentenced.
The Court held: "The federal government in the exercise of its undoubted power to raise and maintain armed forces for the protection
of the country could have disregarded the appellant's conscientious
scruples and conscripted him for any miliary service for which he was
mentally and physically fit." It was further maintained that since the
government had respected his conscientious objections by exempting
him from combat service, they had a right to force appellant to perform some work of national importance, as the appellant was able to
perform under reasonable rules and regulations.
The court concluded by saying that although the appellant's liberty
would be restricted by assignment to the Civilian Service Camp, there
was no unlawful infringing on any of appellant's rights. The conviction
was consequently affirmed.
Arthur M. Diamond.
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